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Thomas Kuhn's Theory of the Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, first published in 1962,
heralded both a renaissance and a shift in the
philosopby of science. The main tendency had
been towards Logical Positivism and its successor
Logical Empiricism. with an emphasis on the
logical structure of scientifIC theories. shown in the
work of Camap, Frank, Hempel, Nagel and
others. This was revitalized with the English
publication of Popper's Logic of Scientific
Discovery in 1959. It was not until after the impact
of Kuhn that the philosophy of science became
thoroughly cognizant of developments in the
history of science (although there were precursors,
such as Hanson). Kuhn offered a powerful new
synthesis of pre-existing elements (some perhaps
unknown to him) such as Wingenstein's notion of
a 'paradigm' and Bachclard's concept of
"epistemological rupture' in the history of ideas.
He constructed profound theory in the philosophy
of science, the influence of which. controversy
notwithstanding, had reverberated through many
other fields of enquiry since.
According to Kuhn, science does notgrow
by a simple accumulation of knowledge. Instead,
it alternates between periods of 'normal' and
'revolutionary' science in its development During
a period of 'normal' science. new knowledge is
accumulated by accretion. as a dominant theory
and paradigm of inquiry are followed and usedas a
model. Anomalies and contradictions in the
dominant paradigm lead to a period of revolution in
which competing camps of scientists promote
alternative theories (including the falsified old
theory). A new theory comes to be accepted and
gradually becomes the new paradigm of
explanation and enquiry. In the shift to the new
theory many of the concepts involved change
meaning (e.g. mass and length in the transition
from Newtonian Mechanics to Relativity Theory).
Kuhn's controversial claimis that theold and new
theories are 'incommensurable', and that their
supporters may not be able to understand each
other.
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The Kuhn-Popper debate in the philosophy
of science hinged on the issue of rational versus
irrational criticism of scientific theories. Popper's
position is prescriptive, and he posits falsification
as a rational critaion forthe rejection of a scientific
theory. Kuhn, on the other hand, proposes a more
descriptive philosophy of science, which while
treating the growth of objective knowledge
acknowledges that rational features are neither
necessary nor sufficient to account for theory
acceptance orrejection.
Although it is beside the point, there is a
fascinating analogy between Kuhn I s theory of
normal and revolutionary development. and
Piaget's theory of assimilation and accommodation
According to Kuhn, science does
not grow by a simple accumulation
or knowledge. Instead, it alternates
between periods or 'normal' and
'revolutionary' science in its
development,
in cognitive growth, respectively. This lends some
suppon to the thesis that individual conceptual
developments mirrors that of humankind as a
whole (the Phylogenetic Law). It represents the
application of the evolutionary maxim 'ontogenesis
recapitulates phylogenesis' to the intellectual plane.
This is a strongly heuristic analogy which provides
a rationale for the use of history in the teaching of
mathematics and science (although ultimately the
analogy breaks down).
The claimis made in this and earlier issues
of the newsletter that the philosophy of
mathematics is currently undergoing a Kuhnian
revolution. with therationalist Euclidean paradigm
of mathematics as an absolute. incorrigible and
logically and hierarchically organized body of
knowledge increasingJy under question. A number
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of mathematicians, philosophers and educators are
taking mathematical practice and history as central
to any account of mathematics, in place of the
traditional narrow focus of the philosophy of
mathematics on the foundations of pure
mathematical knowledge and the existence of
mathematical objects. This new 'maverick'
tradition, as Kircher terms it, regards mathematics
as quasi-empirical and fallible. a view which is
supported by an examination of the history of
mathematics.
A key question concerns the applicability of
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions to
mathematics. Is this theory applicable to
mathematics? Does mathematics have revolutions?
H. B. Griffiths (1987:71) questions the
applicability of the notion of revolutions to
mathematics, and argues "it is doubtful whether
Kuhn"s notion of a paradigm applies to
mathematics in the same way that itdoes to other
Incompatible theories and indeed
paradigms can coexist in
mathematics, unlike in science,
where all the theories purport to
describe the same underlying
objective reality.
sciences'. Griffiths makes this point in the context
of an extended review of a book on mathematics
education. He argues that incompatible theories
and indeed paradigms can coexist in mathematics,
unlike in science, where all the theories purport to
describe the same underlying objective reality.
This is a point well made. Any over-facile parallel
with Kuhn must fall foul on this issue. He argues
that the 'overthrow' of the paradigm of Euclidean
geometry by that of non-Euclidean geometry does
not force mathematicians to reject it, as physics
reject Newtonian theory in favour of Relativity
theory.
On this basis, it must be accepted that not
all major changes ordevelopments of new theories
in mathematics deserve the epithet of
"revolutionary'. Nevertheless, I stillwant to argue
that some radical changes or global restructuring of
the background epistemological and scientific
context of mathematics can be described as Kuhn-
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type revolutions. Such changes result in a
profound re-orientation of mathematics, which can
lead to as much "incommensurability' as is found
in science.
Some possible candidates for mathematical
revolutions are the following. First of all,
infinitesimal based proofs in analysis were
universally accepted, despite Berkeley's (1734)
pungent criticism, until they were banished by new
standards of mathematical rigour in analytic proofs
introduced by Cauchy, Weierstrass and Heine in
the nineteenth centory. This change reflects a shift
in the nature and standards of proof from those
based on geometric intuition, to those of
arithmetical argument (Boyer, 1968). Another
chapter in this story is the re-introduction of
infinitesimal based arguments in the proofs of non-
standard analysis (Robinson, 1966). This reflects
a further change in the nature and standards of
proof accepted in analysis, from those based on
arithmetic to those of axiomatic first-order logic
(Lakatos. 1978; Robinson, 1967). Many other
such examples can be sighted. These include in the
late nineteenth century, the shift of geometric
demonstrations from those relying on spatial
intuition to a reliance on an axiomatic logical basis
(Hilbert, 1899; Richards, 1989); the move to an
axiomatic basis in arithmetic proofs (Peano, 1889);
an the axiomatic rigorization of deductive logic
itself (Frege, 1879).
To dwell a little longer on an example, a
funher example of a "revolution in mathematics' is
the shift of standards of proof in algebra in the
nineteenth century. These changed dramatically
from intuitive generalizations of arithmetic to a
deductive axiomatic basis (Richards, 1987). The
conceptual difficulties in making this transition
should not be underestimated. The rigid
attachment to the field-structure of number,
erystaUized in such laws as Peacock's 'principle of
the permanence of equivalent forms' constituted
what Bache1ard terms an 'epistemological obstacle'
to reconceptua1izing the nature and epistemological
basis of algebra. It took the mathematician
Hamilton over ten years to overcome thisobstacle
in inventing his non-commutative ring of
Quatemions. In doing so, he enabled a
reconceptualization which heralded a revolution in
the nature of algebra and the basis of proof in the
subject
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This and the above examples illustrate a
global restructuring of a branch of mathematics that
might in my view legitimately be termed a
'revolution in mathematics'. What they illustrate is
not the replacement of one mathematical theory by
another. Instead they record a revolutionary shift
in the background scientific and epistemological
context, its constituent proof criteria and
paradigms, and the associated meta-mathematical
views. Changes in the background context can
involve a changed pool of problems, concepts,
methods, informal theories, the language and
symbolism of mathematics, proof criteria and
paradigms. It will also include a shift in the meta-
mathematical views accepted by the mathematical
community, including accepted standards for proof
and definition. views of which types of inquiry are
The outcome of this radical
restructuring is a new or revised
scientific and epistemological
context for mathematics.
valuable, and views concerning the scope and
structure of mathematics. Such changes can result
in a profound re-orientation of mathematics.
The outcome of this radical restructuring is
a new or revised scientific and epistemological
context for mathematics. In particular, it represents
a global restructuring of the epistemology
underlying mathematics, and the way truth, proof
and meaning are conceptualized by the
mathematical community. In the examples cited,
not only did the standards of proof change. In
addition the criteria for evaluating mathematical
theories changed, for these themselves are largely
based on the proof and definition standards
employed in the formulations of the the theory.
Such shifts do seem to correspond well to Kuhn's
notion of scientific revolution, and would not
appear to admit multiplicity as in the case with
mathematical theories. In other words, like
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scientific theories, multiple epistemological
frameworks cannot consistently coexist in
mathematics, justifying the extension of Kuhn's
theory 10mathematics.
A number of other authors have also
suggestedthat there are revolutions in mathematics,
including Kircher (1984), Gillies (forthcoming),
and McCleary (1989) . Overall, whilst agreeing
with Griffiths that Kuhn's Theory of Scientific
Revolutions cannot be directly applied to
mathematics, my claim is that a transformation of it
directed at the underlying epistemological contest,
insteadof just at mathematical theories, does offer
a valuable insight to the history and philosophy of
mathematics.
A final aside is that the above argument
offers grounds for a criticism of Lakatos (1976).
Lakatos ' Logic of Mathematical Discovery only
treats mathematical innovations at the micro-level,
and does not accommodate macro-level changes
such as the mathematical revolutions described
above. Elsewhere, in recognition of this
deficiency, I propose a Generalized Logic of
Mathematical Discovery, seeSocial Constructiyjsm
as a PbiJosophy of Mathematics, fonhcoming,
SUNY Press .)
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